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The Supreme Court is widely regarded, and not only by political
scientists, as a highly political Court, an impression often reinforced by the
ferocious dissents of one or more Justices in many cases. This makes the
Court’s unanimous decisions an important subject for study—for how is
unanimity achieved in a political court?—and it is a subject that has been
neglected.1 This Essay seeks to advance understanding of the phenomenon
of Supreme Court unanimity. Despite the title of the symposium, this is not
an essay about Justice Stevens as such, but it is not irrelevant to his service
on the Court. He was noted for frequent dissents.2 Of the Justices who
served in the 2005 through 2009 Terms3 (the years of the Roberts Court
before Justice Stevens retired), he had the highest dissent rate—30.3% of
the 320 cases in which he participated (Justice Souter was second, at
27.2%—69/254).4 Yet he voted more often to join a unanimous decision
than he voted to dissent—39.1% of the votes he cast were in unanimous
decisions (125/320). Whether this should be thought paradoxical is one of
the questions we try to answer in this Essay.
The Supreme Court Database (also known as the Spaeth Database)
contains data on cases decided since the 1946 Term (the last Term we study
is the 2009 Term). We define unanimous decisions as ones in which no
Justice dissented, even if there were also one or more concurring opinions.
Concurring opinions are actually more common in unanimous decisions
than in non-unanimous ones—41% of the unanimous decisions in The
Supreme Court Database include concurring opinions, compared to 38% for
non-unanimous decisions—although the reason may be arithmetical: in a 5–
4 decision, the maximum number of concurring opinions is four; in a 9–0
decision it is eight. An alternative definition of a unanimous decision—
which would be more realistic in recognizing that concurring opinions often
indicate disagreement with, rather than merely supplementation or
extension of, the majority opinion—would be a decision in which all the
1

But see Saul Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme
Court: Case Stimuli and Judicial Attitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75 (1987); Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein
& Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 129 (2012); Thomas R. Hensley & Scott P. Johnson, Unanimity on the Rehnquist Court,
31 AKRON L. REV. 387 (1998); Pamela C. Corley, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, Deciding To
Agree: Explaining Consensual Behavior on the United States Supreme Court (Apr. 3–6, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/6/6/1/1/
pages266111/p266111-1.php.
2
See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Realism, Pragmatism, and John Paul Stevens, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE:
UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 157, 157 (Earl M. Maltz ed. 2003) (referring to Justice Stevens
as the “Court’s leading dissenter”); Jeffrey A. Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 23, 2007,
at 50, 52.
3
Excluding Justice O’Connor, who retired in January 2006.
4
These percentages exclude cases in which one or more Justices did not sit. The source of our
statistics, unless otherwise indicated, is THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://www.
supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited May 29, 2012), sometimes called the “Spaeth database.”
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Justices joined the majority opinion, whether or not any of them also wrote
a concurring opinion. We have not broken down the data sufficiently to
enable us to analyze unanimous decisions so defined.
Except in the 1969 Term, in which there were only eight Justices, we
exclude unanimous cases in which one or more Justice was absent; the
reason is that we cannot be certain that if a ninth Justice had sat, the case
would still have been decided unanimously.
Under our definition, about 30% of the Court’s orally argued decisions
from 1946–2009 were decided unanimously. Figure 1 shows that the
percentage has been trending upward: from 21% in 1946–1952 (the Vinson
Court) to 34% since 2005 (the Roberts Court). The graph shows that part of
the upward trend is the result of an increasing fraction of unanimous
decisions reversing the Ninth Circuit.5 Over the entire period, about 73% of
Ninth Circuit decisions that the Supreme Court reviewed were reversed
unanimously, compared to 63% for the other circuits. If we exclude them,
the upward trend falls from 1.35% to 1.07% per year.6 Even if the decisions
reversing the Ninth Circuit are included, there is no significant positive
trend over the last twenty-five years (since Rehnquist’s first Term as Chief
Justice). The percentage peaked in 1997 at 51.1% (40.2% if excluding
Ninth Circuit reversals) and has since declined to 37%.

5

Between the 1946 and 2009 Terms, about 73% of decisions by the Ninth Circuit that the Supreme
Court reviewed were reversed unanimously, compared to 63% for the other circuits. On the “rogue”
character of the Ninth Circuit, see Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study
of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711 (2000).
6
We regressed the logarithm of the percentage of unanimous decisions (with and without
unanimous reversals of the Ninth Circuit) against time. The coefficients (and t-ratios) were .014 (5.23)
and .011 (4.20) and were significantly different from each other.
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FIGURE 1: FRACTION OF UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 1946–2009 TERMS
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Because of the Supreme Court’s ideological divisions, the percentage
of unanimous decisions might seem inexplicable unless Supreme Court
Justices have strong dissent aversion, which they used to,7 but no longer
do.8 Another explanation is that unanimous decisions are limited to cases
that do not present ideological issues. A third possible explanation
combines the first two: the ideological stakes are small in cases that are
candidates for being decided unanimously, so even slight dissent aversion
will generate a unanimous decision in cases in which the ideological stakes
are low. A fourth explanation, which seems the most plausible, adds to the
third that when the ideological stakes are small, a combination of dissent
aversion with legalistic commitments is likely to override the ideological
preferences of the Justices.9 Supreme Court Justices are not plausibly
regarded as completely indifferent to such legalistic norms as stare decisis;
a rampant disregard of precedent would unsettle the law and reduce the

7

See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1267 (2001).
8
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note †, ch. 6.
9
We derive this explanation from two papers. See Edelman, Klein & Lindquist, supra note 1; Paul
H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A Lindqust, Measuring Deviations from Expected Voting
Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008).
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authority of the Justices by making them seem just politicians in robes.10
(This doesn’t necessarily mean they “believe” these norms in some strong
sense; they may just find them useful.) We predict, therefore, that few
decisions overruling precedents will be unanimous (though Brown v. Board
of Education11 is a famous example of such unanimity) because it would
require a strong ideological conviction to override a commitment to stare
decisis.12
This prediction is supported by Table 1, which compares the number of
unanimous and non-unanimous Supreme Court decisions that “formally
alter” a Supreme Court precedent. The data come from the Spaeth (U.S.
Supreme Court) database; decisions are coded as formally altering
precedent if they state that they are overruling a decision or use equivalent
language such as that the decision is “disapproved” or is “no longer good
law.”
TABLE 1: FORMAL PRECEDENT ALTERATION BY SUPREME COURT, 1946–2009
Alters/Does Not
Alter Precedent
Alters Precedent
Doesn’t Alter
Precedent
Total

Unanimous/
Non-unanimous
Unanimous
Non-unanimous
Total Cases

33

Percent
Unanimous
Cases
1.6

Nonunanimous
Cases
106

Percent
Non-unanimous
Cases
2.4

2017

98.4

4382

97.6

2050

100.0

4488

100.0

Unanimous
Cases

Precedent Alteration
No. Cases
Percent
33
106
139

23.7
76.3
100.0

No Precedent Alteration
No. Cases
Percent
2017
4382
6399

31.5
68.5
100.0

Note: Cells include only cases in which all nine Justices voted, except in the 1968
Term, when there were only eight participating Justices.

Notice that only 1.6% of unanimous cases alter precedent, while 2.4%
of non-unanimous ones do. Another way to see the difference is that 23.7%
of cases in which precedent is altered are unanimous, whereas 31.5% of
cases in which precedent is not altered are unanimous.
10

See Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021–22
(1996).
11
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12
The articles cited supra note 9 also find that “disordered voting” (voting against the ideological
grain) is unlikely in cases that overrule decisions of the Court.
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We can derive additional indirect evidence of the ideological stakes in
unanimous Supreme Court decisions from the nature of the case (such as
whether it is a civil liberties case or a tax case) and from the presence or
absence of a dissent in the lower court. To this end we estimate the
following regression equation for the probability of a unanimous decision
(Pu):
Pu = f(Dissent, Reversal, CA-Conflict, Other-Conflict, Non-Ideological,
Ninth Circuit, Chief, Subject Area, u)
where Dissent = 1 if the Supreme Court’s opinion notes that there was a
dissent in the court below (Dissent = 0 otherwise),13 Reversal = 1 if the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court, CA-Conflict = 1 if the Court
mentioned a conflict among federal courts of appeals on the issue on which
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, Other-Conflict = 1 if there was a
conflict between other courts or between a federal court (or courts) of
appeals and a state court or courts,14 Non-Ideological = 1 if the ideological
direction of the Supreme Court decision could not be specified, and Ninth
Circuit = 1 if the case came from the Ninth Circuit. Chief is a set of dummy
variables for the Terms of the five Chief Justices in our sample (Chief
Justices Vinson, Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts, with Chief
Justice Vinson as the omitted variable), Subject Area comprises separate
dummy variables for civil liberties, economics, and judicial power cases
(the omitted category, which accounts for fewer than 6% of our sample
cases, consists mainly of federalism cases). Table 2 lists the variables (and
their means) in the regressions.

13

The Dissent variable in THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE represents whether the majority
opinion mentions that there was a dissent in the lower court. Generally it does, especially when
reversing, and most decisions by the Supreme Court are reversals. Still, we are probably underestimating
the number of lower court opinions in which there was a dissent.
14
1336 (87%) of the 1535 conflict cases involve conflicts among the courts of appeals. We exclude
cases from the Federal Circuit. The remaining 199 cases mainly involve conflicts between a federal
court and a state court or between state courts.
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TABLE 2: VARIABLES IN REGRESSIONS ON UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 1946–2009 TERMS
Variables
Unanimous Decision: coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
Direction: Ideological direction of Supreme Court
decision, coded 1 (conservative) or 0 (liberal)
Dissent: Dissent in court below, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
Reversal: Reversal of court below, coded 1 (yes) or 0
(no)
CA-Conflict: Conflict among federal appellate courts,
coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
Other-Conflict: Conflict among federal and state courts
or among state courts, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
Lower Court Direction: Ideological direction of the
lower court decision, coded 1 (conservative) or 0
(liberal)
Non-Ideological: Ideological direction of Supreme
Court decision unspecifiable, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)
Ninth Circuit: Case from Ninth Circuit, coded 1 (yes)
or 0 (no)
Segal–Cover Median: Ideology of the Court’s median
each Term (calculated using Segal & Cover’s editorial
scores)
Fraction Republican: Fraction of Justices appointed by
a Republican President
Civil Liberties: (Adjusted) Civil liberties case, coded 1
(yes) or 0 (no). Includes criminal procedure, civil
rights, first amendment, due process, attorney, and
privacy
Economics: Economics case, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no).
Includes economic activity, union, and tax cases
Judicial Power: Judicial power case, coded 1 (yes) or 0
(no)
Federalism: Federalism case, coded 1 (yes) or 0 (no)

Mean (Standard Deviation)
All
Unanimous Only
(0.29)
(0.45)
(0.49)
(0.42)
(0.50)
(0.49)
(0.22)
(0.20)
(0.42)
(0.40)
(0.63)
(0.66)
(0.48)
(0.47)
(0.22)
(0.27)
(0.42)
(0.45)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.18)
(0.19)
(0.56)
(0.50)

(0.57)
(0.50)

(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.32)

(0.01)
(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.36)

(0.52)
(0.23)

(0.55)
(0.22)

(0.59)
(0.26)

(0.63)
(0.25)

(0.51)
(0.50)

(0.44)
(0.50)

(0.30)
(0.46)
(0.13)
(0.34)
(0.05)
(0.23)
7184

(0.31)
(0.46)
(0.19)
(0.39)
(0.05)
(0.22)
1728

Number of observations
Notes:
(1) All regressions are limited to orally argued cases.
(2) There are only 6020 observations in the regression that include the conflict variables
because no information on conflicts is available for the remaining 1164 decisions.
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We predict a negative coefficient on the Dissent variable and positive
coefficients on the Reversal, CA-Conflict, and Non-Ideological variables. A
dissent in the lower court suggests that the case probably has significant
ideological stakes; if the stakes had been insignificant, the lower court
probably would have been unanimous (even if the panel was ideologically
mixed), owing to the strong dissent aversion that we also find in the federal
courts of appeals.15 But we have not studied dissent aversion in state
supreme courts,16 and many U.S. Supreme Court decisions are decisions on
appeal from such courts.
A unanimous decision is also more likely when the Court reverses
rather than affirms, because some reversals are motivated just by error
correction—to keep the lower courts in line on what may be technical
issues with slight or no ideological stakes. The Court would have little
reason to affirm a case involving a technical issue that the court of appeals
had decided correctly unless there was an intercircuit conflict (CA-Conflict).
The Court feels some obligation to resolve such conflicts even if they do
not present challenging issues—which are issues that are likely to be
ideologically charged—and so neither affirmances nor reversals in
intercircuit conflict cases are as likely to be ideologically motivated as other
Supreme Court decisions. Conflicts represented by the Other-Conflict
variable are less likely to involve technical issues, so we expect this
variable to have a weaker effect on the likelihood of a unanimous decision
than the CA-Conflict variable.
Slightly more than one percent of the cases in our sample (75 out of
7184) could not be classified as either conservative or liberal, suggesting
that ideological issues were not salient; so we expect those cases to be
disproportionately decided unanimously.
We expect a positive coefficient on the Ninth Circuit variable because
of the large number of unanimous reversals of Ninth Circuit cases. And
since ideology is expected to play a larger role in civil liberties cases than in
the other subject matter areas, we predict a negative relation between the
civil liberties variable and the likelihood of a unanimous decision, and
likewise in the judicial power category, which includes cases involving
standing, mootness, comity, review of federal administrative agency
decisions, the act of state doctrine, and other subject areas in which often
there are ideological stakes, though smaller ones than in civil liberties cases.
The positive trend in the fraction of unanimous decisions should yield
positive coefficients on the Chief dummy variables (since Chief Justice
Vinson, who was Chief Justice when the unanimity rate was lowest, is the
omitted Chief variable). The effect should be largest for the Rehnquist and
15

See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note †, ch. 6.
A recent study estimates that there is at least one dissent in about 22% of all state supreme court
decisions. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State
Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1482 (2009).
16
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Roberts Courts in view of the sharp increase in the fraction of unanimous
decisions in the last twenty-five years.17
The regression results in Table 3 support most of our predictions.18
Dissent has a negative and highly significant effect in both equations. A
lower court dissent produces a .068 decline in the probability of a
unanimous decision (that is, a 23% decline relative to the mean probability
of a unanimous decision, .29, when there is no dissent). Both Reversal and
CA-Conflict have positive and highly significant effects on unanimity; a
reversal and a conflict in the lower courts raise the probability of a
unanimous decision by .054 and .057 respectively (19% and 20% relative to
the mean of .285). Other-Conflict is not significant, which is not surprising
since we have no information on whether other conflicts involve nonideological issues. Non-Ideological and Ninth Circuit are also not
significant.
The predicted probability of a unanimous decision is lower in civil
liberties cases than in judicial power cases (21% and 36%, respectively), as
is to be expected, since civil liberties is a more ideologically charged field.
In addition, cases are more likely to be decided unanimously by both the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts than by the Burger, Warren, or Vinson
Courts.

17

We experimented with two other variables: a rough measure of ideological uniformity of the
Court each Term and the Court’s caseload. Neither was close to being statistically significant and neither
affected the magnitude or significance of the other variables.
18
Equations (1) and (2) are nearly identical, except that (2) includes the two conflict variables and
contains fewer observations (6020 instead of 7184). The information on lower court conflicts is based on
the reasons the majority opinion gave for granting certiorari. In 1164 cases no reason was given.
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TABLE 3: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE PROBABILITY OF A UNANIMOUS DECISION, 1946–2009
TERMS
Probability of Unanimous Decision
Equation
Dissent
Reversal

(1)

(2)

-0.068**
(4.86)
0.054**
(4.39)

0.042
(0.99)
0.016
(0.95)
0.044
(0.81)
0.066
(1.32)
0.166**
(3.33)
0.139**
(2.93)
-0.082**
(3.45)
-0.023
(0.90)
0.076**
(2.71)

-0.066**
(4.22)
0.059**
(4.45)
0.057**
(4.48)
0.049
(1.35)
0.085
(1.19)
0.016
(0.92)
0.048
(0.84)
0.065
(1.28)
0.158**
(3.15)
0.130**
(2.74)
-0.104**
(3.68)
-0.050
(1.67)
0.061
(1.88)

7184

6020

CA-Conflict

-

Other-Conflict

-

Non-Ideological
Ninth Circuit
Warren Court (1953–1968)
Burger Court (1969–1985)
Rehnquist Court (1986–
2004)
Roberts Court (2005–2009)
Civil Liberties
Economics
Judicial Power
Number of Observations

Notes:
(1) *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.
(2) The entries are marginal-effect coefficients at the mean values of all variables.
(3) Federalism (and Miscellaneous) is the omitted case category.
(4) Standard errors are adjusted by clustering on Term of Court (64 clusters, 1 for each
Term).

If we add a dummy variable for whether the case was decided in a per
curiam opinion rather than a signed opinion, the positive coefficient on the
judicial power variable is no longer statistically significant. A
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disproportionate number of judicial power cases are decided per curiam—
23%, versus only 5% for all other subject areas (on average), and per
curiam decisions, even in orally argued cases (for our sample is limited to
orally argued cases), generally signify a less important or less contentious
case than one decided in a signed opinion. And sometimes a case is
dismissed in a per curiam opinion because a jurisdictional flaw was
discovered after the case had been argued, so there is no decision on the
merits to classify as liberal or conservative.
We also divided the cases into finer subject matter areas. Table 4 lists
the fraction of unanimous cases in each area, ranked from highest to lowest.
TABLE 4: MEAN FRACTION OF UNANIMOUS DECISIONS ACROSS FINE SUBJECT AREAS
Subject Area
Mean Fraction
Number of Cases
Interstate Relations
0.41
56
Judicial Power
0.41
943
Federalism
0.33
336
Attorneys
0.31
81
Unions
0.29
332
Economic Activity
0.29
1504
Civil Rights
0.29
1124
Privacy
0.28
90
Federal Taxation
0.28
290
Due Process
0.26
301
Criminal Procedure
0.20
1539
First Amendment
0.20
563
Notes:
(1) We excluded the Miscellaneous category because it contained only 17 cases.
(2) The total number of cases is 7159.

The four classes with fractions below the mean of .285—due process,
criminal procedure, First Amendment, and privacy—are ideologically
charged, but so are some of the classes with fractions at or above the mean,
such as civil rights, unions, and federalism.
We suggested earlier that if the ideological stakes in a case are small,
even slight dissent aversion is likely to produce a unanimous decision. But
the outcomes might still be correlated with the Court’s overall ideology. We
test that hypothesis using two measures of ideology: the fraction of Justices
appointed by Republican Presidents and the Justices’ median Segal–Cover
scores.19
19

Segal–Cover scores are estimates of a Supreme Court Justice’s ideology at the time of his
appointment. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 111–12 (2005); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–61 (1989), updated in Jeffery A Segal,
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Since the petitioner wins about 66% of the unanimous cases, we expect
a negative coefficient on the variable denoting the ideological direction of
the lower court decision; this is a high rate of reversals (though similar to
the reversal rate for non-unanimous decisions) and we expect reversals to
be heavily influenced by ideology because the Supreme Court has neither
the time nor the inclination to correct merely technical errors by the lower
courts. Testing this hypothesis requires estimating separate regressions for
unanimous decisions in which there is, and unanimous decisions in which
there is not, a lower court conflict; for if there is a conflict that the Supreme
Court wants to resolve it is immaterial which side of the conflict the lower
court was on.
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. The ideological
direction of the lower court decision is highly significant in regressions (1)
and (2). And the effects are large. For example, a conservative (liberal)
lower court decision reduces (increases) the probability of a conservative
unanimous Supreme Court decision by between 0.42 and 0.44, holding the
other variables constant.

Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 813–15 (1995). Martin–Quinn scores are estimates of a
Supreme Court Justice’s ideology as inferred from her judicial votes as a Supreme Court Justice. See
Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–52 (2002); Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimates be Used as Explanatory Variables? 1–2 (Oct. 8, 2005)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://adm.wustl.edu/media/working/resnote.pdf.
We experimented with two other measures of the court’s overall ideology—the median Justice
Martin–Quinn score and the fraction of Justices who identified themselves as Republicans when they
were appointed (this fraction was identical to the fraction appointed by a Republican President in the
1990 to 2008 Terms but not the 1958 to 1989 Terms—for example, Justice Powell, appointed by Nixon,
was a Democrat). These substitutions had only minor effects on the regressions.
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TABLE 5: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF UNANIMOUS DECISIONS, 1946–
2009 TERMS
Variables

Equation
Ideological
Direction of
Lower Court
Decisions
Fraction
Republican
Segal–Cover
Median
Ninth Circuit
Civil Liberties
Economics
Judicial
Power
Number of
Observations

Fraction
Conservative Votes
No Conflict in
Lower Courts
(1)
(2)
-0.441**
(10.92)
0.138
(1.70)

- 0.417**
(10.38)
-

0.124*
(2.51)
0.094
(1.33)
0.042
(0.60)
0.502**
(6.87)

0.339**
(4.00)
0.115*
(2.28)
0.092
(1.31)
0.042
(0.62)
0.500**
(6.78)

1189

1189

-

Fraction
Conservative Votes
Conflict in Lower Courts
(3)

(4)

-

-

0.236*
(2.05)
0.082
(1.36)
-0.036
(0.32)
-0.139
(1.43)
0.034
(0.32)
539

0.465**
(3.41)
0.077
(1.28)
-0.057
(0.50)
-0.141
(1.41)
0.023
(0.21)
539

Notes:
(1) *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01.
(2) The entries are marginal-effect coefficients at the mean values of all variables.
(3) Federalism (and Miscellaneous) is again the omitted case category.
(4) The ideological direction of the 1189 9–0 decisions (8–0 for the 1969 Term) is
coded: 0 = liberal; 1 = conservative.
(5) Standard errors are clustered by Term of Court (64 clusters, 1 for each Term).

The coefficients on the two ideological measures (Fraction Republican
and Segal–Cover Median) are positive, but the first is not statistically
significant, and both have only small effects. The coefficients imply that a
decline in the number of appointees of a Republican President from five to
four would decrease the fraction of conservative unanimous decisions by
between .015 (in equation (1), which holds constant the ideological
direction of the lower court decision) and .026 (in equation (3), which is
limited to cases in which there was a conflict in the lower courts). Neither
effect is large relative to the .41 fraction of unanimous Supreme Court
decisions that are conservative. But the predicted effects would be much
larger if a Court consisting of eight Justices appointed by Republican
presidents and one appointed by a Democratic president switched to eight
Democratic appointees and one Republican appointee. That would reduce
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the probability of a conservative unanimous decision by between .11 and
.19 (27% and 46%, respectively, relative to the mean of .41).
When we substitute the median Segal–Cover scores for the Fraction
Republican variable, the coefficients on the Court’s ideology are more
significant. Even though Segal–Cover scores are based on newspaper
editorials prior to confirmation, they avoid the obvious errors of classifying
Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Souter as conservative Justices just because
Republican Presidents appointed them.
Of the remaining variables in Table 5, cases from the Ninth Circuit are
significantly more likely to be decided conservatively, holding constant the
ideological direction of the Ninth Circuit decision. This effect, however, is
not significant when there is a conflict in the lower courts (equations (3)
and (4)); this is consistent with our distinction between conflict and
nonconflict cases. The subject matter variables are generally not significant
except for the increase in the probability of a conservative decision in
judicial power cases in equations (1) and (2) but not (3) and (4).
In short, ideology plays a small but still significant role in unanimous
decisions. This is consistent with our theory and with the indirect evidence
presented in Table 5 that decisions are unanimous when the ideological
stakes are not large enough to lead a Justice who disagrees with the
majority to dissent.
Table 6 supplements the analysis by presenting some voting
characteristics of the current Justices, plus Justice Souter, who was
appointed in the same general period as Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer; we exclude Justices Stevens and O’Connor, who were appointed
much earlier. The liberal Justices, plus Justice Thomas, have the highest
combined percentage of votes for unanimous decisions and dissenting
votes. The implication (ignoring Justice Thomas, an outlier in many
respects) is that liberals are more inclined to join decisions that do not
present significant ideological stakes, and more inclined to dissent in cases
that do present such stakes because the Court is predominantly
conservative; this may explain Justice Stevens’s voting pattern noted at the
beginning of this Essay.
Justice Kennedy, the swing Justice, gets his way most of the time: he
dissents the least among the Justices and writes or joins concurring opinions
rarely. Justice Scalia—arguably the Court’s intellectual leader—writes or
joins concurring opinions the most. Justice Roberts is the second-leastfrequent dissenter, and writes or joins the fewest concurring opinions,
perhaps in order to signal that as Chief Justice he usually gets his way or
that he seeks, by his example, to promote consensus.
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TABLE 6: VOTES BY RECENTLY APPOINTED JUSTICES (BEGINNING WITH JUSTICE SOUTER)
Name

Alito
Breyer
Ginsburg
Kennedy
Roberts
Scalia
Sotomayor
Souter
Thomas

Percentage of
Justice’s
Votes Cast in
Unanimous
Decisions

Percentage of
Justice’s
Dissenting
Votes in All
Cases

Percentage of
Justice’s
Concurring
Votes in All
Cases

0.374
0.421
0.420
0.413
0.391
0.405
0.424
0.419
0.421

0.159
0.207
0.217
0.097
0.122
0.178
0.227
0.182
0.202

0.123
0.118
0.098
0.096
0.063
0.155
0.106
0.094
0.144

Percentage of
Justice’s
Concurring
Votes in
Unanimous
Decisions
0.124
0.112
0.111
0.077
0.056
0.164
0.107
0.109
0.148

To conclude, this Essay has established the existence of an ideology
effect in unanimous decisions, but a weaker one than in non-unanimous
decisions, of the Supreme Court. These findings are consistent with a
realistic conception of the Court as a mixed ideological–legalistic judicial
institution.
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